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Fairness as Compassion:
Towards a Less Unfair Facility Siting Policy*
Benjamin Davy**
Orthodox Siting Policy
The European Court of Human Rights' judgment in Ldpez Ostra
v. Spain' captured the essence of orthodox siting policy when it
ruled that "regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and of the
community as a whole." Mrs. Gregoria L6pez Ostra had been forced to
move away from her residence in Lorca because of the pollution and
"pestilential smell" caused by a waste treatment plant that had
commenced operation only twelve meters from her home. Although
the operator had failed to obtain a permit, the authorities did not stop
the illegal activity. After all, the facility had been sited on municipal
land and was subsidized by the government "to solve a serious pollution
problem in Lorca due to the concentration of tanneries."
The European Court of Human Rights, however, found that the
government had overstepped its discretion to promote the public
interest. The right of individuals to enjoy their private lives and homes,
protected under Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights (1957), comprises the right to protection
from severe environmental pollution. Although the government may
allow industrial developments to the extent necessary in a democratic
society, it must not completely relinquish the legally protected interests
of its citizens. Therefore, the Court ruled that the Kingdom of Spain
violated Mrs. L6pez Ostra's rights, because it "did not succeed in
striking a fair balance between the interest of the town's economic well-
being - that of having a waste-treatment plant - and the applicant's
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effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her private
and family life."
Orthodox siting policy is adamant that nobody be exposed to
"pestilential smell" or other severe pollution caused by a hazardous
waste facility. The facts in Ldpez Ostra provide a good description of
bad siting policy. A waste treatment plant must not be located too close
to homes, especially if it malfunctions and emits waves of hydrogen
sulphide (characteristic rotten-egg smell), and the government must not
support such an abominable development. Conspicuously unfair, it
amounts to violation of civil rights and liberties.
Yet, good "orthodox" siting policy requires much more than simply
preventing abominable developments. It considers economic progress,
environmental protection and a wide variety of other public and private
concerns to balance competing interests. The overarching principle of
orthodox siting policy is to maximize the general welfare by efficiently
accounting for all costs and benefits involved in the siting of a
hazardous waste facility. Efficient pollution control, use of land or
business operation all manifest the same spirit of efficiency. Orthodox
siting policy considers the siting of a hazardous waste facility as a
technical problem that has to be addressed and solved by experts, such
as managers, engineers, planners or regulators. Accordingly, the
manifold requirements for the siting of a hazardous waste facility can
be consolidated into four criteria: profitability, functionality, safety and
legality. A development of a hazardous waste facility must yield a
profit to the developer (to avoid financial disaster). A facility must
perform as it is expected to, namely treat hazardous waste so as to
render it less hazardous or non-hazardous (to avoid technical failure).
The development must be carried out in a way that human health and
the environment are protected from risk (or it would be dangerous).
Finally, the development of a hazardous waste facility must comply
with all standards and permit requirements to avoid illegaility.
The four criteria of orthodox siting policy can be traced back to the
utilitarian underpinnings of private property, technology-based
economic growth ideology, land use regulation under the police power,
and the mainstream of environmental protection and hazardous waste
management. They distinctly influenced, for example, the 1972
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
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Environment, the 1976 U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
or the 1985 EC Council Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of
Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment. These and
similar sources of international and domestic law presuppose that
commercial hazardous waste treatment may be a lucrative business and
an essential component of economic infrastructure. It is also assumed,
however, that the development of a hazardous waste facility must be
closely scrutinized and controlled to protect human health, the
environment and other public interests.
The Social Limits to Orthodox Siting
In many countries, the siting of hazardous waste facilities and other
locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) is delayed or obstructed by "not
in my back yard" (NIMBY) opposition. Potential host communities,
local residents or environmental activists often resist the development of
noxious facilities, even if the proposed facilities are - according to
orthodox criteria - in a broad sense efficient.2 Although industry
and regulators had ample opportunity over the past fifteen years to
consider the shortcomings of orthodox siting, only little has been
achieved in coming to terms with LULU and NIMBY disputes.
Surprisingly, developers and governments are still rather dumbfounded
by opposition to profitable, functional, safe and legal developments.
Endless courtroom battles or spectacular displays of citizens activism
and civil disobedience clearly indicate the social limits to orthodox
siting policy. Moreover, the U.S. environmental justice movement flags
the disturbing consequences of orthodox siting policy, namely the
disproportional burden of poor and minority communities which are
encumbered with hazardous waste facilities and similar LULUs.3
Frequently, orthodox siting policy is not only baffled by public
opposition, but also chooses the wrong remedies for overcoming the
NIMBY syndrome. These remedies also address siting disputes as
technical problems that require efficient solutions. The logic behind
2 Frank J. Popper, Siting LULUs, 47 Planning 12 (1981) and Frank J. Popper,
The Great LULU Trading Game, 58 Planning 15 (1992).
3 Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality
(2d ed. 1994) and Jim Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green: The Rise of Blue-Collar and
Minority Environmentalism in America (1994).
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orthodox reactions considers public opposition either as an obstacle for
necessary developments or as a call for stricter regulation: If local
communities resist, curb their opportunities to impede LULUs; if the
public complains about risk, issue stricter safety regulations! Siting
disputes are only exacerbated, however, by preempting local planning
powers, increasing the regulatory pressure on developers or streamlining
the formal permit proceedings.
In sharp contrast, a considerable wealth of literature challenges the
orthodox siting policy. It advises to address public opposition to the
siting of hazardous waste facilities completely different:
0 The design of risk assessment should be aware of differences in
the risk perception of experts and laypersons and must account for
the problems of the social amplification of risks.4
* Developers and regulators should particularly pay attention to
establishing trust between all stakeholders to avoid the detrimental
effects of mutual distrust.5
* The social costs for host communities and its residents, caused by
the development of a hazardous waste facility, should be offset by
financial compensation or risk substitution. 6
* With respect to potential host communities, siting should be
voluntary and abstain from coercing communities to host LULUs.7
4 Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of
Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 Policy Sci. 127 (1978); Roger
E. Kasperson, Six Propositions on Public Participation and Their Relevance for Risk
Communication, 6 Risk Anal. 275 (1986); Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social
Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 Risk Anal. 177 (1988); Ortwin
Renn et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical
Applications, 48 J. Soc. Issues 137 (1992) and Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah
Lichtenstein, Why Study Risk Perception? 2 RiskAnal. 83 (1982).
5 Robin Bidwell et al., Public Perceptions and Scientific Uncertainty: The
Management of Risky Decisions, 7 Env'l Impact Assess. Rev. 5 (1987); James Flynn
ct al., Trust as a Determinant of Opposition to a High-Level Radioactive Waste
Repository: Analysis of a Structural Model, 12 Risk Anal. 417 (1992); Roger E.
Kasperson, Dominic Golding & Seth Tuler, Social Distrust as a Factor in Siting
Hazardous Facilities and Communicating Risks, 48 J Soc. Issues 161 (1992); Paul
Slovic, James H. Flynn & Mark Layman, Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of
Nuclear Waste, 255 Science 1603 (1991) and Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust,
and Democracy, 13 RiskAnal. 675 (1993).
6 David Morell & Christopher Magorian, Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities: Local
Opposition and the Myth of Preemption (1982); Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow &
Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting and Public Opposition (1983) and Kent E. Portney,
Siting Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities: The NIMBY Syndrome (1991).
7 Michael B. Gerrard, Whose Backyard, Whose Fairness? Fear and Fairness in
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0 Siting disputes should not be addressed in terms of legal conflict
resolution, but as a challenge for negotiating mutually beneficial
agreements and for consensus building.8
* Siting disputes should not be considered as locally confined
skirmishes, but as a conflict between political cultures that struggle
over the definition of risk, pollution and fairness.9
The common denominator of this literature is the conviction that the
siting of a hazardous waste facility does not only entail technical, but
specific social questions. Accordingly, a resolution of siting disputes
cannot be expected from a better treatment technology ("the perfect
incinerator") or increased permit conditions ("the perfect regulation").
A resolution, or at least an improvement, can only be expected from
addressing the social issues involved in LULU and NIMBY disputes.
This aspect is emphasized by The Facility Siting Credo, a concise
guideline for finding alternatives to orthodox siting policy.10
Fairness as Compassion
Addressing hazardous waste facility siting as a social rather than a
technical problem reveals several important aspects that are concealed
by absorption with efficiency. The environmental impact statements or
expert opinions about facility design become less important than the
fact that the stakeholders (developers, regulators, opponents) differ in
Toxic and Nudear Waste Siting (1994) and Barry G. Rabe, Beyond NIMBY:
Hazardous Waste Siting in Canada and the United States (1994).
8 Bryan H. Massam, The Right Place: Shared Responsibility and the Location of
Public Facilities (1993); Lawrence E. Susskind, The Siting Puzzle: Balancing
Economic and Environmental Losses and Gains, 5 Env'l Impact Assess. Rev. 157
(1985); Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual
Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes (1987) and Lawrence Susskind & David
Laws, Siting Solid Waste Facilities in the United States, in Handbook of Solid Waste
Management (Frank Kreith, ed. 1994).
9 Karl Dake, Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk, 48 J.
Soc. Issues 21 (1992); Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay
on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (1983); Steve Rayner
& Robin Cantor, How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to Societal
Technology Choice, 7 RiskAnal. 3 (1987); Michiel Schwarz & Michael Thompson,
Divided We Stand. Redefining Politics, Technology and Social Choice (1990).
10 Howard Kunreuther, Kevin Fitzgerald & Thomas D. Aarts, Siting Noxious
Facilities: A Test of the Facility Siting Credo, 13 Risk Anal. 301 (1993); Lawrence
Susskind, A Negotiation Credo for Controversial Siting Disputes, 1990 Negotiation
J 309 and David Laws & Lawrence Susskind, Changing Perspectives on the Facility
Siting Process, 1 Maine Policy Rev. 29 (1991).
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their perceptions of risks, benefits and burdens. The long-term
relationships between the stakeholders gain more relevance than the
short-term result of their interactions. The overall efficiency of a project
grows less significant than the distribution of advantages and
disadvantages caused by a project or its obstruction.
Orthodox siting policy is poorly equipped to address diverse
perceptions, long-term relationships or distributive effects. Propaganda
disguised as "community outreach," perfunctory public hearings or
trash-for-jobs promises cannot mitigate a fundamental lack of
compassion for victims of "efficient" siting. Developers and regulators
often fail to comprehend the sharp sense of injustice that energizes
opposition to a LULU. Opponents consider themselves as victims of
injustice for different reasons. The development may defile their sense
of purity. They may feel aggrieved because their community has been
singled out to bear the brunt of hazardous waste management. They
may reject technology-based waste treatment as a whole, e.g., because it
only stimulates the generation of more waste. Yet whatever the reasons,
as long as the sharp sensation of injustice remains, it produces
considerable political energy. Judith Shklar clearly pointed out that
social arrangements are "unjust unless we take the victim's view into full
account and give her voice its full weight. Anything less is not only
unfair, it is also politically dangerous." 11
Siting policy must not only be aware of efficiency but also account
for grievances of losers of the siting game. Fairness as compassion does
not yield to anyone who complains about having been victimized,
simply because signs of distress are displayed. Nor does it take protests
lightly. Unfortunately, many developers and regulators neglect signs of
public opposition, especially in its early stages, when they dismiss
objections as "irrational" or "hysterical." Ignoring the outcry against
injustice leads to their own demise, however. LULU and NIMBY
disputes drastically change the makeup of developments which may
look "efficient" from the perspective of the drawing board. I have yet to
see the project of a hazardous waste facility that, after becoming
entangled in public controversy, remained profitable, functional, safe
and legal.
11 Judith N. Shkiar, The Faces of Injustice 126 (1990).
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Essential Injustice
If siting stakeholders suffer from injustice, why not redress their
plight by treating them equitably? It is often assumed that injustice can
be remedied by dispensing justice. By complying with a certain
standard of justice or fairness, a person can avoid being unjust or unfair
to others. From this point of view, siting a hazardous waste facility
would have to comply with a presupposed standard of justice and
fairness. But what standard should be selected? Fairness as compassion
- a heightened awareness for whomever is the victim of a particular
siting policy - renders a disturbing answer to this question. The
stakeholders in LULU and NIMBY disputes usually assume different
concepts of justice. A result of the siting process that appears to be
blatantly unjust to some can appear entirely just to others. Therefore,
modifications of the siting process may not necessarily render a more
just or more fair result (but only a differently unfair result).
To describe the predicament, three types of justice can be
distinguished, namely libertarian, utilitarian and social. Libertarian
justice assumes that social arrangements have to provide for
unrestrained interactions between free individuals. Friedrich von
Hayek's "catallaxy" (a spontaneous order produced by the market) or
Robert Nozick's concept of a minimal state illustrate the idea of
libertarian justice that directs to let the strongest prevail in a free
competition. Utilitarian justice assumes that social arrangements have to
provide for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Jeremy
Bentham's and John Stuart Mill's utility principle is a predecessor of the
modern administrative state, equipped with cost-benefit-analysis and
regulatory powers to protect and promote the public best. Social
justice assumes that social arrangements must cater to the destitute.
John Rawls' difference principle, which allows inequality only to the
extent as it is beneficial to the least advantaged, is the most popular
contemporary example for social justice.
The following epitomize the three concepts.
* Justice is what is beneficial to the strong, or: Maximize liberty!
* Justice is what is beneficial to the most, or: Maximize happiness!
• Justice is what is beneficial to the poor, or: Minimize pain!
In siting, these three notions often determine how stakeholders address
risk, environmental impact assessments, permit conditions, citizens'
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activism, economic progress or other issues pertaining to siting a
hazardous waste facility. From a highly generalizing point of view,
stakeholders expect justice to be done as follows: Developers assume a
standard of libertarian justice and expect as little restraint as possible to
pursue developments competitively. Regulators assume a standard of
utilitarian justice and try to keep the broader picture of environmental
protection and hazardous waste management in mind. Opponents,
who regard themselves as victims of a powerful industrial-regulatory
complex, assume a standard of social justice and expect protection
from being exploited for the developer's profit or the public interest.
The coexistence of rival notions of justice puts considerable strain
on social arrangements of all kinds. Compared with the large variety of
social conflicts, LULU and NIMBY disputes actually are innocuous
examples of collision between rival notions of justice. Yet they are, as
Popper put it, a metaphor for a country's "incapacity to govern itself
assertively or productively, much less fairly or trustfully." 1
2
The problem of the coexistence of different concepts of justice
cannot be solved by identifying and pursuing the "right" concept of
justice. The problem is to cope with the consequences of any choice of a
particular concept of justice. Assume, for example, that the standard of
social justice is adopted as a blueprint for the design of a fair siting
policy. This may ensue a BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing
Anywhere Near Anybody) approach to facility siting. Although this
consequence will be welcomed by environmentalists or environmental
justice advocates, it will hardly be appreciated by industry, regulators or
consumers. The same is true, mutatis mutandi, for utilitarian justice
(the prevalent approach to facility siting) or libertarian justice (which
would lead to aggressive deregulation).
In other words, the coexistence of rival notions of justice renders the
adoption of any standard of justice (whether libertarian, utilitarian or
social justice) vulnerable to critiques of those whose notion of justice is,
at the same time, rejected. This phenomenon can be called "essential
injustice." 13 Fairness as compassion cannot speak to essential injustice
12 Popper (1992), supra note 2, at 17.
13 Benjamin Davy, Essential Injustice: When Legal Institutions Fail to Resolve
Environmental and Land Use Disputes,forthcoming.
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by dispensing justice pursuant to the violated concept of justice. This
would only enrage the beneficiaries of other concepts of justice who, in
turn, would be victimized by this remedy. Social conflicts rarely can be
settled by applying a presupposed standard for the obvious reason that
"justice" itself is a very controversial topic. Yet if "justice for all" cannot
be the goal of facility siting, what else could be done to address issues
of justice and fairness in environmental and land use policy?
Avoiding Injustice
Fairness as compassion does not advise to pick one group of
stakeholders in the siting arena and turn them into the champions of a
sweeping campaign for justice. Rather, it advises to consider each of the
different notions of justice that are involved in LULU and NIMBY
disputes and to eliminate and avoid injustice to the extent possible.
Whenever injustice cannot be avoided, it urges not to dismiss the
complaints of its victims as "irrelevant" or "unfortunate," but to
aggressively search for ways to cope with their anguish.
Much too often, orthodox siting policy compels the losers of a
siting game (whether developers, regulators or opponents) to accept the.
results as causa finita. However, defeated stakeholders cannot easily
accept that the case is settled. Developers whose profit margins dwindle
away if their permit applications are denied cannot always turn to more
profitable endeavors. The scars inflicted upon administrative agency
personnel, traumatized by citizens' activism in public hearings, do not
heal quickly. The citizens who fought against the siting of a hazardous
waste facility cannot return to their normal lives, once a permit has been
granted, and rest assured that the plant in their backyard is "safe" and
"legal." The point in question is not, however, that the respective
winners of a siting dispute should shake hand with the losers and say:
"We're sorry... and, by the way, you've been jolly good sports!"
(although shaking hands and apologizing sometimes can prevent the
escalation of a siting dispute). The point in question is that the
predominant framework for siting actually encourages to isolate the
losers and to leave them alone in their disappointment about the
mishaps of justice. Neither the development nor the defeat of a
controversial development can be considered as success, as long as
diverse perceptions, long-term relationships or distributive effects are
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not thoroughly accounted for. Fairness as compassion is not a moral or
ethical category. It is a prerequisite for maintaining the social stability
required for efficient facility siting. It is not satisfied with consolation
prizes that are awarded to lull the victims of injustice, but it demands
to acknowledge that "essential injustice" requires full attention for
diverse perceptions, the relationships between stakeholders and the
distributive impact of siting efforts.
Fully addressing the problem of essential injustice in hazardous
waste facility siting has to employ a two-tier approach towards avoiding
injustice (of whatever flavor).
First, all social arrangements must be abandoned which entrench
facility siting in a way that systematically disadvantages one group of
stakeholders and hampers with their opportunity to accomplish justice.
In many legal systems, hazardous waste facility siting is regulated in a
way that critically disadvantages local communities and their residents.
The infamous NIMBY syndrome is a consequence of the firm
commitment to utilitarian justice and the goal of orthodox siting policy
to promote profitable, functional, safe and legal projects.
Second, the adversarial and result-oriented framework for facility
siting should be replaced with a system that encourages not only to
search for a fair balance of interests, but also to accomplish a fair
balance between different justices, different rationalities. This system
would combine a large number of needful elements which are adopted
for their aptitude to consider the needs and preferences of differently
rational stakeholders. Suggestions like The Facility Siting Credo which
emphasize the importance of consensus-building offer valuable advice as
to how vast accumulations of injustice can be avoided through a process
that accounts for the social tensions involved in the siting of a hazardous
waste facility.
